In this paper we give improved constructions of several central objects in the literature of randomness extraction and tamper-resilient cryptography. Our main results are:
INTRODUCTION
Randomness extractors are fundamental objects in the study of pseudorandomness, a branch of modern theoretical computer science. Their motivations come from the need of uniform random bits in many applications, such as randomized algorithms, distributed computing, and cryptography, and the fact that natural random sources are almost always biased. Informally, randomness extractors transform imperfect random sources (whether naturally so or as a result of adversarial information leakage) into nearly uniform random bits, which can then be used in standard applications. Over the past decades randomness extractors have been extensively studied.
To model imperfect randomness, we use the by now standard model of a general weak random source with a certain amount of entropy.
De nition 1.1. The min-entropy of a random variable X is H ∞ (X ) = min x ∈supp(X ) log 2 (1/ Pr[X = x]).
For X ∈ {0, 1} n , we call X an (n, H ∞ (X ))-source, and we say X has entropy rate H ∞ (X )/n.
It is well known that by just having one weak source as input, no deterministic extractor can work for all (n, k ) sources even if k = n − 1. Several ways are thus explored to get around this. One When the tampering acts on the seed of a seeded extractor, one obtains a generalization of strong seeded extractors called seeded non-malleable extractors, originally introduced by Dodis and Wichs in [29] .
De nition 1.4 (Non-malleable extractor). A function snmExt :
{0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} m is a seeded non-malleable extractor for min-entropy k and error ϵ if the following holds : If X is a source on {0, 1} n with min-entropy k and A : {0, 1} d → {0, 1} d is an arbitrary tampering function with no xed points, then
where U m is independent of U d and X .
When the tampering acts on the sources in an independent source extractor, one obtains a generalization of independent source extractors called seedless non-malleable extractors, originally introduced by Cheraghchi and Guruswami [17] .
De nition 1.5 (Seedless Non-Malleable C-Source Extractor). A function nmExt : ({0, 1} n ) C → {0, 1} m is a (k, ϵ )-seedless non-malleable extractor for C independent sources, if it satis es the following property: Let X 1 , · · · , X C be C independent (n, k ) sources, and f 1 , · · · , f C : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be C arbitrary tampering functions such that there exists an f i with no xed points, then |nmExt(X 1 , · · · , X C ) • nmExt( f 1 (X 1 ), · · · , f C (X 2 ))
Further, we say that the non-malleable extractor is strong if for every i, we have that
Remark 1.6. Motivated by applications to non-malleable codes, the original de nition of seedless non-malleable independent source extractors in [17] is more general, and considers the case that the tampering functions may have some xed points. However, Cheraghchi and Guruswami [17] showed that the de nition using tampering functions without xed points actually implies the more general de nition, with a small loss in parameters.
We can also generalize the de nition to handle more than one tampering functions.
De nition 1.7 (Seeded t-Non-malleable extractor).
A function snmExt : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} m is a seeded t-non-malleable extractor for min-entropy k and error ϵ if the following holds : If X is a source on {0, 1} n with min-entropy k and A 1 , · · · , A t : {0, 1} d → {0, 1} d are t arbitrary tampering functions with no xed points, then
This de nition can also be generalized to the case of seeded t-non-malleable extractor for more than one weak sources in the obvious way, and we omit the de nition here.
As stated above, seeded non-malleable extractors were rst introduced by Dodis and Wichs in [29] , to study a cryptographic problem known as privacy ampli cation. Although they seem to be irrelevant to independent source extractors, it turns out that these two kinds of extractors are closely related. Indeed, since the author's previous work [40, 42] which rst established connections between seeded non-malleable extractors and independent source extractors, their connections have been demonstrated in several subsequent work. In particular, with other techniques, these connections have led to the recent breakthrough construction of two source extractors by Chattopadhyay and Zuckerman [15] . We now brie y review previous work below.
Independent source extractors. The introduction of independent source extractors, as well as the rst explicit construction of a two-source extractor appeared in [18] , where Chor and Goldreich showed that the well known Lindsey's lemma gives an extractor for two independent (n, k ) sources with k > n/2. Since then there has been essentially no progress until Barak et. al [4] introduced new techniques in additive combinatorics into this problem, and constructed extractors for O (1/δ ) independent (n, δn) sources. Subsequently, a long line of fruitful results [4-6, 9, 19, 38, 41, 42, 44, 50, 51] has introduced many new techniques and culminated in the three source extractor of exponentially small error for poly-logarithmic min-entropy by the author [44] . In the case of two-source extractors, Bourgain [9] gave a construction that breaks the entropy rate 1/2 barrier, and works for two independent (n, 0.49n) sources. In a di erent work, Raz [51] gave an incomparable result of two source extractors which requires one source to have min-entropy larger than n/2, while the other source can have min-entropy O (log n). In a recent result, Chattopadhyay and Zuckerman [15] greatly improved the situation and gave the rst explicit two-source extractor for (n, k ) sources with k ≥ log C n for some large enough constant C. Their construction has polynomially small error, but only outputs one bit. This was later improved by the author to output almost all entropy [45] and by Meka [48] to work for smaller min-entropy.
Very recently, there has been a new line of work focusing on constructing explicit independent source extractors for very small min-entropy (i.e., near logarithmic). Cohen and Schulman [25] constructed extractors for O (1/δ ) sources with min-entropy log 1+δ n. Chattopadhyay and Li [12] improved this result to give an explicit extractor for O (1) sources with min-entropy log n2 O ( √ log log n) , and this was subsequently improved by Cohen [20] to achieve a 5-source extractor with the same entropy requirement. Finally, Ben-Aroya et. al [7] further improves this and achieves a two-source extractor for min-entropy log n2 O ( √ log log n) . However, for min-entropy O (log n) the best known extractor still requires O (log log n) sources [25] .
Seeded non-malleable extractors and privacy ampli cation. Privacy ampli cation [8] is a basic problem in information theoretic cryptography, where two parties with local (non-shared) uniform random bits communicate through a public channel to convert a shared secret weak random source X into shared secret nearly uniform random bits. The communication channel is watched by an adversary Eve, who has unlimited computational power and tries to corrupt the protocol. Standard strong seeded extractors are enough to give very e cient protocols for this problem in the case where Eve is passive (i.e., can only see the messages but cannot change them). In the more complicated case where Eve is active (i.e., can arbitrarily change, delete and reorder messages), the goal is to design a protocol that uses as few number of interactions as possible, and outputs a shared uniform random string R as long as possible (the di erence between the length of the output and H ∞ (X) is called entropy loss). The protocol is associated with a security parameter s, and ensures that if Eve is active, then the probability that Eve can successfully make the two parties output two di erent strings without being detected is at most 2 −s . On the other hand, if Eve remains passive, then the two parties should achieve shared secret random bits that are 2 −s -close to uniform. We refer the readers to [27] for a formal de nition.
Much research has been devoted to this problem [10, 24, 26, 27, 29, 37, 39, 40, 43, 47, 52] . It is known that when the entropy rate of X is large, i.e., bigger than 1/2, there exist protocols that take only one round (e.g., [26, 47] ), albeit with quite large entropy loss. When the entropy rate of X is smaller than 1/2, [29] showed that any protocol has to take at least two rounds with entropy loss at least O (s). Thus, the natural goal is to design a two-round protocol with such optimal entropy loss, for any possible security parameter (ideally up to Ω(k )). However, all protocols before the work of [27] require O (s) rounds or entropy loss O (s 2 ).
In [29] , Dodis and Wichs further showed that two-round privacy ampli cation protocols with optimal entropy loss can be constructed using explicit seeded non-malleable extractors. Using the probabilistic method, they showed the existence of nonmalleable extractors when k > 2m + 2 log(1/ε) + log d + 6 and d > log(n−k +1)+2 log(1/ε)+5. However, they were not able to give any explicit construction. The rst explicit seeded non-malleable extractor was constructed in [27] , with subsequent improvements in [24, 30, 39, 40] . Unfortunately all these constructions require minentropy at least 0.49n, and thus only give two-round privacy amplication protocols with optimal entropy loss for such min-entropy. Although, combined with other ideas, [27] also gives poly(1/δ ) round protocols with optimal entropy loss for min-entropy k ≥ δn, any constant δ > 0. Subsequently, without improving on the nonmalleable extractors, the author [40] gave a two-round protocol with optimal entropy loss for min-entropy k ≥ δn, any constant δ > 0. Using a relaxation of non-malleable extractors called nonmalleable condensers, the author [43] also obtained a two-round protocol with optimal entropy loss for min-entropy k ≥ C log 2 n, some constant C > 1, as long as the security parameter s satis es k ≥ Cs 2 .
The next improvement in non-malleable extractors appeared in [11] , where Chattopadhyay, Goyal and Li constructed explicit nonmalleable extractors with error ε, for min-entropy k = Ω(log 2 (n/ϵ )) and seed-length d = O (log 2 (n/ϵ )). This gives an alternative protocol matching that of [43] . Further improvements were obtained by Cohen [21, 22] , where he constructed non-malleable extractors with seed length d = O (log(n/ϵ ) log((log n)/ϵ )) and min-entropy k = Ω(log(n/ϵ ) log((log n)/ϵ )); seed-length O (log n) and min-entropy k = n/(log n) O (1) ; and seed length d = O (log n + log 3 (1/ϵ )) and min-entropy k = Ω(d ). However, none of these improves the privacy ampli cation protocols in [43] .
Very recently, Chattopadhyay and Li [12] obtained an improved non-malleable extractor with error ε, for min-entropy k = log (n/ϵ )
, and min-entropy k = O (log n) and seed length d = O (log n) for error ϵ ≥ 2 − log 1−β n for any constant 0 < β < 1. Independently, Cohen [20] also obtained a non-malleable extractor with error ε, for min-
. Both these constructions give two round privacy ampli cation protocols with optimal entropy loss, for security parameter s up to k/2 O (
Seedless non-malleable extractors and non-malleable codes. Seedless non-malleable extractors were rst introduced by Cheraghchi and Guruswami [17] , in the context of non-malleable codes. Nonmalleable codes, introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs [35] , are a useful generalization of standard error correcting codes in the sense that they can handle a much larger class of attacks.
Most notably, they can provide security guarantees even if the attacker can completely overwrite the codeword. Informally, a non-malleable code for a speci c tampering family of tampering functions F , consists of a randomized encoding function E and a deterministic decoding function D, such that if a codeword E (x ) is modi ed into f (E (x )) by some function f ∈ F , then the decoded message x = D( f (E (x ))) is either the original message x, or a completely unrelated message. As shown in [35] , such non-malleable codes can be used in several applications in tamper-resilient cryptography. Formally, non-malleable codes are de ned as follows.
De nition 1.8. [2] Let NM k denote the set of trivial manipulation functions on k-bit strings, which consists of the identity function I (x ) = x and all constant functions f c (x ) = c, where c ∈ {0, 1} k . Let E : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} m be an e cient randomized encoding function, and D : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} k be an e cient deterministic decoding function. Let F : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} m be some class of functions. We say that the pair (E, D) de nes an (F , k, ϵ )-non-malleable code, if for all f ∈ F there exists a probability distribution G over NM k , such that for all x ∈ {0, 1} k , we have
Remark 1.9. The above de nition is slightly di erent form the original de nition in [35] . However, [2] shows that the two de nitions are equivalent.
While it can be seen that even non-malleable codes cannot exist if F is completely unrestricted, it is also known to exist for many broad tampering families. One of the most natural tampering families, and the most well studied, is the so called split-state model. Here, a k-bit message x is encoded into t parts of messages 1 , · · · , t , each of length n. Now the adversary can arbitrarily tamper with each i independently. In this case, the rate of the code is de ned as k/(tn). Formally, we have the following de nition.
De nition 1.10. Given any > 1, let S n denote the tampering family in the -split-state-model, where the adversary applies arbitrarily correlated functions h 1 , · · · , h to separate, n-bit parts of string. Each h i can only be applied to the i-th part individually.
Note that although the functions h 1 , · · · , h can be correlated, their correlation does not depend on the original codewords. Thus, they are a convex combination of independent functions, applied to each part of the codeword. Thus, without loss of generality, hereafter we may assume that each h i is an independent function acting on the i-th part of the codeword individually. In this paper we will mainly consider the case of = 2, i.e., the two-split-state model.
This model arises in many applications naturally, for example when the di erent parts of messages 1 , · · · , t are stored in different parts of memory. It can also be viewed as a kind of "nonmalleable secret sharing scheme". Clearly, the case of t = 1 corresponds to unrestricted tampering functions, and cannot be handled by non-malleable codes. Thus the case of t = 2 is the most useful and interesting setting. There has been a lot of work studying non-malleable codes in the t-split-state model. Since in this paper we focus on the information theoretic setting, we will only brie y review those previous work in the same setting.
The existence of non-malleable codes was rst proved in [35] , and then Cheraghchi and Guruswami [16] improved this result to show that the optimal rate of non-malleable codes in the 2-splitstate model is 1/2. The rst explicit construction appears in [33] , where the authors constructed explicit non-malleable codes for 1-bit messages in the split-state model. Subsequently, Aggarwal et. al [3] constructed the rst explicit non-malleable code for k-bit messages. Their encoding has message length n = O (k 7 log 7 k ). This was later improved by Aggarwal [1] to obtain n = O (k 7 ).
Cheraghchi and Guruswami [17] found a connection between non-malleable t-source extractors and non-malleable codes in the t-split state model. Their construction allows one to construct nonmalleable codes in the t-split state model given su ciently good non-malleable t-source extractors. However, they were not able to construct explicit non-malleable two-source extractors even for min-entropy k = n. Using this connection and techniques form additive combinatorics, Chattopadhyay and Zuckerman [14] constructed a non-malleable 10-source extractor and a constant rate non-malleable code in the 10-split-state model. In a subsequent work, Chattopadhyay, Goyal and Li [11] constructed the rst explicit non-malleable two-source extractor for min-entropy k = (1 − γ )n with output Ω(k ) and error 2 −k Ω (1) , and used it to give an explicit non-malleable code in the 2-split state model with rate n −Ω (1) .
Finally, the work of Aggarwal et. al [2] , has a construction which "achieves" a constant rate non-malleable code in the 2-split-state model. However, recently the author found an error in their proof (we brie y discuss the error in Appendix A), and thus this result does not hold. Currently, only non-malleable codes of rate n −Ω(1) can be deduced from their work.
Our Results
We obtain improved results in all of the above problems. First, we have the following theorem which gives improved constructions of seeded non-malleable extractors. T 1.11. There exists a constant C > 1 such that for any n, k ∈ N and 0 < ϵ < 1 with k ≥ C (log n + log log(1/ϵ ) log(1/ϵ )), there is an explicit strong seeded (k, ϵ ) non-malleable extractor {0,
Combined with the protocol in [29] , this gives the following theorem. T 1.12. There exists a constant 0 < α < 1 such that for any n, k ∈ N and security parameter s ≤ αk/ log k, there is an explicit two-round privacy ampli cation protocol with entropy loss O (log n + s), in the presence of an active adversary.
Combined with the techniques in [7] , we obtain the following theorem which gives improved constructions of two-source extractors. T 1.13. For every constant ϵ > 0 there exists a constant c > 1 and an explicit two-source extractor Ext : ({0, 1} n ) 2 → {0, 1} for min-entropy k ≥ c log n log log n, with error ϵ.
As a corollary, we obtain the following improved constructions of Ramsey graphs.
Improved Non-malleable Extractors, Non-malleable Codes and Independent Source Extractors STOC'17, June 2017, Montreal, Canada C 1.14. For every large enough integer N there exists a (strongly) explicit construction of a K-Ramsey graph on N vertices with K = (log N ) O (log log log N )
Next we give an improved construction of a non-malleable twosource extractor. T 1.15. There exists a constant 0 < γ < 1 and a nonmalleable two-source extractor for (n, (1 − γ )n) sources with error 2 −Ω(n/ log n) and output length Ω(n).
We give an algorithm to e ciently sample from the pre-image of this extractor, and together with the connection in [17] , we obtain the following theorem. T 1.16. For any n ∈ N there exists an explicit non-malleable code with e cient encoder/decoder in the 2-split-state model with block length 2n, rate Ω(1/ log n) and error = 2 −Ω(n/ log n) .
Finally, we obtain an explicit extractor for 10 independent sources with entropy O (log n). T 1.17. For every constant ϵ > 0 there exists a constant c > 1 and an explicit ten-source extractor Ext : ({0, 1} n ) 10 → {0, 1} for min-entropy k ≥ c log n, with error ϵ.
Independent Work. Independent of our work, and using di erent techniques, Cohen [23] obtained similar results for seeded nonmalleable extractors and two-source extractors. Speci cally, he constructed seeded non-malleable extractors for seed length and min-entropy O (log n) +log(1/ϵ )polylog log(1/ϵ ), that outputs Ω(k ) bits. He also constructed two-source extractors for min-entropy log npolylog log n.
Overview of the Constructions and Techniques
Our results are obtained by developing several new techniques, which we brie y summarize below.
(1) We develop a new way to construct independence preserving mergers, an object introduced in [12, 25] . Our new merger is much more randomness e cient in the sense that to merge L random rows, it only uses entropy O (s log L), where s is the entropy required to perform one step of extraction (e.g., log(n/ϵ )). Previous constructions in [12, 20, 25] require
Our construction thus exponentially improves the multiplicative factor of s, which is the key to get theÕ (log n) entropy and seed length in the seeded non-malleable extractor, and the small error 2 −Ω(n/ log n) in the seedless non-malleable extractor. (2) We develop a new way to e ciently uniformly sample from the pre-image of any output of our seedless nonmalleable extractor. This is the key to get e cient encoder of our non-malleable codes. Our new sampling method greatly simpli es previous ones such as that in [11] , in the sense that it treats most of the construction details as a black box. Therefore, it is also quite general and can potentially be applied to other constructions of seedless non-malleable extractors, saving us the pain and e ort to design speci c "inverting" algorithms. Indeed, in a recent joint work with Chattopadhyay [13] , we have applied the sampling method to non-malleable extractors with respect to a ne tampering functions. (3) We show a way to reduce the problem of constructing seeded non-malleable extractors to the problem of constructing seedless non-malleable extractors for independent sources, and a general way to transform any standard seedless non-malleable extractor for independent sources to another seedless non-malleable extractor for independent sources that can handle t adversaries. This establishes new connections between the two di erent kinds of nonmalleable extractors and is the key to get the 10-source extractor for min-entropy O (log n).
We now give a more detailed overview of our constructions and the techniques. Both our constructions of seeded non-malleable extractor and seedless non-malleable extractor follow the high level framework of recent constructions [11, 12, [20] [21] [22] . Speci cally, we rst obtain a small advice such that with high probability the untampered advice is di erent from the tampered version. The short size of the advice guarantees that even conditioned on the xing of the advice, the seed and the source (or di erent sources) are still independent and have high min-entropy. We then use an improved correlation breaker with advice to obtain the output. Informally, given the advice, the correlation breaker does a series of computations using the inputs to break correlations. As a result the output is guaranteed to be close to uniform given the tampered output, if the advice is di erent from the tampered advice.
Take the seeded non-malleable extractor for example. It is well known that to achieve error ϵ, one can use an advice of length O (log(n/ϵ )) (or even smaller, as shown in [20] ), and length Ω(log(1/ϵ )) is necessary. Moreover, this only costs O (log(n/ϵ )) bits in the seed and O (log(n/ϵ )) entropy in the source. We now turn to the part of the correlation breaker with advice. This part is going to follow the recent developments in [12, 20] , and uses a key ingredient called (non-malleable) independence preserving merger. Speci cally, let us brie y recall what is done in [12] . There, given the advice of length L, we rst use an additional O (log(n/ϵ )) bits to create a matrix of L rows, such that each row corresponds to a bit in the advice and each row is uniform (but may be correlated with other rows). The property guaranteed is that on the bit that is di erent in the advice and the tampered advice, the corresponding row in the matrix is uniform even conditioned on the corresponding row in the tampered version of the matrix. At this point, the non-malleable independence preserving merger uses some additional random bits to gradually merge the matrix into one nal row, while always keeping the independence between one row in the matrix and the corresponding row in the tampered matrix.
In [12] , the construction rst uses a basic merger, which uses O (l log(m/ϵ )) random bits to merge a matrix of l rows, each row having length m. Then, one chooses a particular l and applies the basic merger to the initial matrix of L rows, merging l rows each time. This takes log L/ log l steps. Each step one needs to use fresh random bits. However, since there is also a tampered seed, if each time we use the same number of fresh random bits, then they may already contain no entropy given the previously leaked tampered seeds. Therefore, in [12] , each time the number of fresh random bits used is at least twice as large as the number of random bits used in the previous step. This means the number of random bis needed is going to grow exponentially, and eventually we need 2 O (log L/ log l ) l log(m/ϵ ) random bits. A simple calculation shows that to minimize this quantity, we should choose l such that log l = log L and this gives us 2 O (
√ log log(n/ϵ )) log(m/ϵ ) bits needed. Here we signi cantly improve the merger in [12] . From the above discussion, one can see that if somehow we can get around the bottleneck of doubling the length of the random bits used each time, then ideally we would just need O (l log L/ log l log(m/ϵ )) random bits. This quantity is minimized when l is a constant (e.g., 2) and this gives us O (log L log(m/ϵ )) = O (log log(n/ϵ )) log(m/ϵ ) random bits, which is much better than the previous one. How do we achieve this? Recall that the reason why we need to double the length of the random bits used each time, is that previously used bits from the tampered seed can leak information about the current random bits of the untampered seed. If we can prevent this from happening, then we will be done. In other words, what we need is to guarantee that each time the new random bits used in the seed is (close to) independent of the random bits previously used in the tampered seed. Our crucial observation is that this is exactly a "look-ahead" property (i.e., random variables produced later are independent of random variables produced before), and can be achieved by using alternating extraction.
This motivates the following construction. Let the source be X and the seed be Y . After obtaining the advice, take a small slice Y 1 of Y and use Y 1 to extract a small uniform output Z from X . Use Z and Y (which still has a lot of entropy) to do an alternating extraction and output log L + 1 random variables R i . One can show that conditioned on the xing of Z , these random variables are all deterministic functions of Y , and each R i is close to uniform conditioned on the previous ones and the previous tampered ones (i.e., they satisfy the look-ahead property). Now, we can use R 1 and X (which, again, still has a lot of entropy) to create the initial matrix of L rows, and then subsequently each time use a new R i to merge this matrix.
The above construction almost achieves what we want, except one problem. The problem is that the basic merger, which uses alternating extraction itself, only outputs say 0.2m bits if originally each row has m bits (think of the non-malleable extractor case, which can output at most k/2 bits if the min-entropy is k). Thus, if we simply repeat the merging step for log L steps, then the length of the output will decrease to 2 −O (log L) m; and for this to be meaningful we would need m ≥ 2 O (log L) , which would make m and also the min-entropy k become at least poly(L) = polylog(n/ϵ ). This is too large for our goal. Thus, we modify this construction so that we can compensate for the loss of output length each time. Speci cally, after obtaining the advice, we rst take a small slice Y 1 of Y and use Y 1 to extract a small uniform output Z from X . Note that conditioned on the xing of Y 1 , Z is a deterministic function of X . Now we take a slightly larger slice Y 2 of Y , and a slice Z 2 of Z . Note that given (Y 1 , Y 2 ), Y still has a lot of entropy. Similarly, given (Y 1 , Z 2 ), Z still has a lot of entropy. We will now rst use Z 2 and Y to do an alternating extraction and output 2 log L + 1 random variables R i . We will also use Y 2 and Z to do an alternating extraction and output log L + 1 random variables S i . One can show that conditioned on (Y 1 , Z ), all the R i are deterministic functions of Y , and satisfy the look-ahead property. Similarly, conditioned on (Y 1 , Y 2 ), all the S i are deterministic functions of X , and satisfy the look-ahead property. We now use S 0 and R 0 (the rst blocks in the sequences) to obtain the initial matrix, which conditioned on the xing of R 0 is a deterministic function of S 0 . Then, we repeat the merging for log L steps. Each step we will use two R i 's and one S i . Consider a particular step i. We rst use R 2i−1 to merge the matrix, reducing the number of rows to a half. Note that conditioned on the xing of R 2i−1 , the output is a deterministic function of S i−1 . We then use each row of the output as a seed to extract from R 2i . Now conditioned on the previous matrix, the new output is a deterministic function of R 2i . Finally, we use each row of the new output as a seed to extract from S i . Conditioned on the xing of R 2i , the output becomes a deterministic function of S i , and by choosing the length of each S i to be larger than 2m we can restore the length of each row in the matrix to m. This whole process still preserves the independence between the corresponding rows in the matrix and the tampered matrix. We can thus repeat the process until we obtain the nal output. Note that for all the alternating extraction, we can control the length of Z and S i , so that the number of random bits used is smaller than O (log(n/ϵ )). We also need to set ϵ to be slightly smaller than the error we want to achieve. Careful calculations show that we can achieve the seed length and entropy requirement in Theorem 1.11. By setting the parameters correctly, we can also ensure that the whole process described above does not consume much entropy, thus we can use the nal output to extract from the original source and output Ω(k ) bits.
The non-malleable two-source extractor essentially follows from the same construction, except we now know that both sources already have min-entropy (1 − γ )n. Thus, we can a ord to set the error parameter to be 2 −Ω(n/ log n) . E cient sampling. By the connection in [17] , the above nonmalleable two-source extractor implies a non-malleable code in the 2-split-state model with rate Ω(1/ log n). However, to obtain an ecient encoder, we need to nd a way to e ciently sample uniformly from the pre-image of any given output. Since the construction of the non-malleable two-source extractor is complicated and involves multi steps of alternating extraction etc., it appears that the sampling procedure may also be complicated. Indeed, in [11] the sampling procedure consists of a series of carefully designed steps to "invert" each intermediate extraction step, which takes a lot of e ort. In addition, it is not clear if one can adapt that inverting algorithm to our construction. Here, we instead show that we can signi cantly simplify the sampling procedure. In fact, we are going to treat most of the details in the construction of the non-malleable two-source extractor as a black box, and all we need are two ingredients from [11] : First, a seeded extractor IExt : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} m with d = O (log(n/ϵ )) and m = Ω(d ), such that for any xed output s and any xed seed r , one can e ciently uniformly sample from the pre-image (this is because for any xed seed, the output is a linear function of the input source), and the pre-image always has the same size. Second, to obtain the advice, rst we take a small slice X 1 of the source X , and a small slice Y 1 of the source Y . Both slices have size 3γn (assuming both sources have min-entropy (1 − γ )n). We take the inner product of X 1 and Y 1 , and use the output to sample Ω(n/ log n) coordinates from the Reed-Solomon encodings of both the rest part of X and the rest part of Y . The advice α is obtained by concatenating X 1 , Y 1 and the sampled coordinates. Now we slightly modify the non-malleable two-source extractor in the following way. We will take two other slices Y 2 and Y 3 of Y , with the guarantee that each has high min-entropy conditioned on previously leaked information, and the total length of (Y 1 , Y 2 , Y 3 ) is less than n/2 (but still Ω(n)). Similarly we take another slice X 2 of X , which has high min-entropy conditioned on previously leaked information, and the total length of (X 1 , X 2 ) is less than n/2 (but still Ω(n)). Given the advice, we use (X 2 , Y 2 ) to run the non-malleable two source extractor described above, and obtain an output V . We then compute the nal output W = IExt(Y 3 , V ). The non-malleable two-source extractor guarantees that V is close to uniform given the tampered version, and this will be preserved in W .
Given any output W , we now brie y describe how to e ciently uniformly sample from the pre-image. We rst uniformly generate (X 1 , Y 1 , X 2 , Y 2 ) and the advice α. From these things we can compute the output V . Note that here we are treating the details in the construction of the non-malleable two-source extractor as a black box. Now, given V and W , by the property of IExt we can e ciently sample Y 3 , and the pre-image always has the same size. Finally, we need to sample the rest parts of X and Y , given the variables we have obtained and α. For this step, we note that once we have (X 1 , Y 1 ), we know the coordinates of the Reed-Solomon codes that we sampled, and these give us a system of linear equations. Note that we have at least n/2 free variables in both X and Y , thus by setting the length of the advice appropriately (which is Ω(n)) we can ensure that there are more variables in the system than the number of equations. Therefore we can e ciently sample the pre-image by inverting the system of linear equations. Further note that the encoding matrix of the Reed-Solomon code has the property that regardless of the positions of the coordinates, as long as the number of sampled coordinates is the same, the encoding matrix always has the same rank. Thus the pre-image also has the same size regardless of the positions of the coordinates sampled. Therefore, altogether we can e ciently uniformly sample from the pre-image.
Independent source extractor. A corollary of the work of BenAroya et. al [7] is that if one can construct seeded t-non-malleable extractor for some constant t with error ϵ, seed length and minentropy O (log(n/ϵ )), then one also gets an explicit two-source extractor for min-entropy O (log n). The two-source extractor outputs one bit with any constant error. In this paper we show that we can reduce the task of constructing such seeded non-malleable extractors to the task of constructing non-malleable two-source extractors for (n, (1 − γ )n) sources with error 2 −Ω(n) , where γ is any constant.
To see this, suppose we have such a non-malleable two-source extractor, then we can construct a seeded non-malleable extractor roughly as follows. Let the seed be Y and the source be X . First, we can take a small slice of Y and use it as a seed in an extractor, to convert X into a close to uniform string. Let the result beX . Then, as usual, we obtain an advice α such that α α with high probability, where α is the tampered version of α. Now, we take a small slice Y 2 of Y , and a small slice X 2 ofX , with the guarantee that both slices have entropy rate > 1/2. We take the inner product of (X 2 , Y 2 ), and use this output as an extractor to convert bothX and Y back into nearly uniform strings (the reason why we can do this is that the inner product is a two-source extractor strong in both sources). Let the outputs beX andỸ . We can now append α to bothX andỸ . By setting the lengths appropriately we obtain two independent (conditioned on the xing of previous random variables) (m, (1 − γ )m) sources, where m = O (log(n/ϵ )) as long as both X and Y have min-entropy at least C log(n/ϵ ) for some constant C > 1. We know that with high probability both sources will be di erent than their tampered versions, thus we can now apply the non-malleable two-source extractor to get an output with error ϵ.
The above construction is just for one tampering function, but we can use an argument similar to that used in [19, 41] to gradually increase the resilience, until eventually the extractor works for t tampering functions. This puts an O (t 2 ) factor on the seed length and entropy requirement, which is still a constant if t is a constant. Clearly, the approach described above works not just for nonmalleable extractors with optimal error, but works for any nonmalleable extractor. Thus our non-malleable two-source extractor directly implies a two-source extractor for (n, O (log n log log n)) sources. The approach also extends naturally to the case of nonmalleable (s + 1)-source extractors (think about the s + 1 sources as two independent sources where one of them actually consists of s sources), which would give a seeded non-malleable extractor for s independent sources (again, think about the s sources as just one weak source). Thus, we can use the non-malleable 10-source extractor with optimal error in [14] to give a seeded non-malleable extractor for 9 independent sources. Together with the construction in [7] this gives an explicit extractor for 10 independent (n, O (log n)) sources, which outputs one bit with any constant error.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We give some preliminaries in Section 2. We then de ne alternating extraction in Section 3, and non-malleable independence preserving merger in Section 4. In Section 5 we construct the new correlation breaker with advice, the key ingredient in all our constructions. The formal constructions of our non-malleable extractors and nonmalleable codes are deferred to the full version. Finally we conclude with some discussions and open problems in Section 6, and include a brief discussion of the error in [2] in Appendix A.
PRELIMINARIES
We often use capital letters for random variables and corresponding small letters for their instantiations. Let |S | denote the cardinality of the set S. For a positive integer, U denotes the uniform distribution on {0, 1} . When used as a component in a vector, each U is assumed independent of the other components. All logarithms are to the base 2.
Probability Distributions
De nition 2.1 (statistical distance). Let W and Z be two distributions on a set S. 
Somewhere Random Sources and Extractors
De nition 2.3 (Somewhere Random sources). A source X = (X 1 , · · · , X t ) is (t × r ) somewhere-random (SR-source for short) if each X i takes values in {0, 1} r and there is an i such that X i is uniformly distributed.
De nition 2.4. (Seeded Extractor) A function
with min-entropy k and independent Y which is uniform on {0, 1} d ,
Average Conditional Min Entropy
De nition 2.5. The average conditional min-entropy is de ned as 
Prerequisites from Previous Work
Sometimes it is convenient to talk about average case seeded extractors, where the source X has average conditional min-entropy H ∞ (X |Z ) ≥ k and the output of the extractor should be uniform given Z as well. The following lemma is proved in [28] .
For a strong seeded extractor with optimal parameters, we use the following extractor constructed in [36] . 
([36]
). For every constant α > 0, and all positive integers n, k and any ϵ > 0, there is an explicit construction of a strong (k, ϵ )-extractor Ext : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} m with d = O (log n + log(1/ϵ )) and m ≥ (1 −α )k. In addition, for any ϵ > 2 −k /3 this gives a strong (k, ϵ ) average case extractor with m ≥ k/2.
T 2.10 ([18]
). For every 0 < m < n there is an explicit two-source extractor IP : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m based on the inner product function, such that if X , Y are two independent (n, k 1 ) and (n, k 2 ) sources respectively, then
We need the following explicit construction of seedless nonmalleable extractors in [14] . T 2.11. There exists a constant δ > 0 and an explicit (k, ϵ )-seedless non-malleable extractor for 10 independent sources CZExt : ({0, 1} n ) 10 → {0, 1} m with k = (1 − δ )n, ϵ = 2 −Ω(n) and m = Ω(k ).
The following standard lemma about conditional min-entropy is implicit in [49] and explicit in [47] . 
We also need the following lemma. L 2.13.
[41] Let (X , Y ) be a joint distribution such that X has range X and Y has range Y. Assume that there is another random variable X with the same range as X such that
Cheraghchi and Gursuswami [17] showed that the relaxed de nition 1.5 implies the general de nition of non-malleable two-source extractor with a small loss in parameters. Speci cally, we have L 2.15 ([17] ). Let nmExt be a (k −log(1/ϵ ), ϵ )-non-malleable two-source extractor according to De nition 1.5. Then nmExt is a (k, 4ϵ )-non-malleable two-source extractor with the general de nition.
The following theorem was proved by Cheraghchi and Gursuswami [17] , which establishes a connection between seedless non-malleable extractors and non-malleable codes. T 2.16. Let nmExt : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m be a polynomial time computable seedless 2-non-malleable extractor at min-entropy n with error ϵ. Then there exists an explicit non-malleable code with an e cient decoder in the 2-split-state model with block length = 2n, rate = m 2n and error = 2 m+1 ϵ.
ALTERNATING EXTRACTION
An important ingredient in our construction is the following alternating extraction protocol, which was rst introduced in [34] , and then used a lot in constructions related to extractors (e.g., [29, 41] ). Alternating Extraction. Assume that we have two parties, Quentin and Wendy. Quentin has a source Q, Wendy has a source W . Also assume that Quentin has a uniform random seed S 1 (which may be correlated with Q). Suppose that (Q, S 1 ) is kept secret from Wendy and W is kept secret from Quentin. Let Ext q , Ext w be strong seeded extractors with optimal parameters, such as that in Theorem 2.9. Let s be an integer parameter for the protocol. For some integer parameter > 0, the alternating extraction protocol is an interactive process between Quentin and Wendy that runs in steps.
In the rst step, Quentin sends S 1 to Wendy, Wendy computes R 1 = Ext w (W , S 1 ). She sends R 1 to Quentin and Quentin computes S 2 = Ext q (Q, R 1 ). In this step R 1 , S 2 each outputs s bits. In each subsequent step i, Quentin sends S i to Wendy, Wendy computes R i = Ext w (W , S i ). She replies R i to Quentin and Quentin computes S i+1 = Ext q (Q, R i ). In step i, R i , S i+1 each outputs s bits. Therefore, this process produces the following sequence:
Look-ahead Extractor. Now we can de ne our look-ahead extractor. Let Y = (Q, S 1 ) be a seed, the look-ahead extractor is de ned as
The following lemma is a special case of Lemma 6.5 in [11] . L 3.1. Let W be an (n w , k w )-source and W be a random variable on {0, 1} n w that is arbitrarily correlated with W . Let Y = (Q, S 1 ) such that Q is a (n q , k q )-source, S 1 is a uniform string on s bits, and Y = (Q , S 1 ) be a random variable arbitrarily correlated with Y , where Q and S 1 are random variables on n q bits and s bits respectively. Let Ext q , Ext w be strong seeded extractors that extract s bits from sources with min-entropy k with error ϵ and seed length s. Suppose (Y , Y ) is independent of (W ,W ), and k w , k q k + 2 s + 2 log( 1 ϵ ). Let laExt be the look-ahead extractor de ned above using Ext q , Ext w , and
where ϵ 1 = O ( ϵ ).
NON-MALLEABLE INDEPENDENCE PRESERVING MERGER
We now describe the notion of non-malleable independence preserving merger, introduced in [12] based on the notion of independence preserving merger introduced in [25] . For simplicity we assume here we only have one adversary, which will be enough for our applications.
, 1} m 1 satis es the following property. Suppose
• X, X are random variables, each supported on boolean
We have the following construction and theorem. L-Alternating Extraction We extend the previous alternating extraction protocol by letting Quentin have access to L sources Q 1 , . . . , Q L (instead of just Q) which have the same length. Now in the i'th round of the protocol, he uses Q i to produce the r.v S i = Ext q (Q i , R i ). More formally, the following sequence of r.v's is generated:
The NIPM is now constructed as follows. Let S 1 be a slice of X 1 with length O (log(d/ε)), then run the L-alternating extraction described above with • X, X are random variables, each supported on boolean L ×m matrices s.
CORRELATION BREAKER WITH ADVICE
We now use the non-malleable independence preserving merger to construct an improved correlation breaker with advice. A correlation breaker, as its name suggests, uses independent randomness to break the correlations between several correlated random variables. A prototype correlation breaker was rst constructed implicitly in the author's work [41] , and then later strengthened and formally de ned in [19] . A correlation breaker with advice additionally uses some string as an advice. This object was rst introduced and used without its name in [11] , and then explicitly de ned in [21] . We have the following de nition.
De nition 5.1 (Correlation breaker with advice). A function Let X , X be n-bit random variables with H ∞ (X ) ≥ k, such that (X , X ) is independent of (Y , Y ). Then, for any pair of distinct a-bit
In addition, we say that AdvCB is strong if
For our construction we need the following ip-op extraction scheme. The ip-op function was constructed by Cohen [19] using alternating extraction, based on a previous similar construction of the author [41] . Subsequently, it was used in the construction of non-malleable extractors by Chattopadhyay, Goyal and Li [11] . The ip-op function is a basic version of correlation breaker, and (informally) uses an independent source X to break the correlation between two r.v's Y and Y , given an advice bit. We now describe this more formally. 
We construct a correlation breaker such that X , X , Y , Y are all on d bits such that H ∞ (X ) ≥ 0.9d and H ∞ (Y ) ≥ 0.9d. Using the above ingredients, our construction of the correlation breaker with advice is given below. For simplicity, when we say a strong seeded extractor for min-entropy k, we mean a strong average case seeded extractor for average conditional min-entropy k.
• Fix an error parameter ϵ to be chosen later. Let s be an integer such that s ≥ max{c log(d/ϵ ), 8c log(3s/ϵ )} where c is the maximum of the hidden constant in the seed length of the optimal seeded extractor in Theorem 2.9, and the two constants c, c 5.2 in Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 5.2.
• Let Ext be a strong seeded extractor which uses r = c log(3s/ϵ ) random bits to extract from an (3s, 2c log(3s/ϵ )) source and outputs r = c log(3s/ϵ ) bits with error ϵ , from Theorem 2.9.
• Let Ext w , Ext q be strong seeded extractors which use s bits to extract from a (d, 4s) source and outputs 3s bits with error ϵ .
• Let Ext be a strong seeded extractor which uses r = c log(3s/ϵ ) random bits to extract from an (3s, 1.5s) source and outputs s bits with error ϵ , from Theorem 2.9.
• Let Ext be a strong seeded extractor which uses s ≥ c log(d/ϵ ) random bits to extract from a (d, 0.15d ) source and outputs 0.1d bits with error ϵ . • Let IP be the two source extractor from Theorem 2.10, set up to extract from two 0.3d-bit sources and output 0.05d bits. (1) Let = log a. 1 Let X 1 be a slice of X with length 0.3d, and Y 1 be a slice of Y with length 0.3d. Compute Z = IP(X 1 , Y 1 ). Using Z , Y as Q,W (and S 1 is a small slice of Q) and Ext w , Ext q as the extractors, run alternating extraction between Z and Y for 2 +1 steps, and output R 0 , R 1 , R 2 , · · · , R 2 = laExt(Y , Z ), where each R i has 3s bits. Similarly, using Z , X as Q,W (and S 1 is a small slice of Q) and Ext w , Ext q as the extractors, run alternating extraction between Z and X for + 1 steps, and output S 0 , S 1 , S 2 , · · · , S = laExt(X , Z ), where each S i has 3s bits. two rows by two rows: Note that V j−1 has a/2 j−1 rows, for
2i , R 2j−1 ) which outputs r bits, andṼ
We now have the following lemma. L 5.3. There exists a constant C > 1 such that for any 0 < ϵ < 1/2 and any a, d ∈ N such that d ≥ C log a log(da/ϵ ), there is an explicit construction of a function AdvCB : {0, 1} d × {0, 1} d × {0, 1} a → {0, 1} d /10 that satis es the following. Let Y , Y be d-bit random variables such that H ∞ (Y ) ≥ 0.9d, and X , X be d-bit random variables with H ∞ (X ) ≥ 0.9d. Assume that (X , X ) is independent of (Y , Y ). Then, for any pair of distinct a-bit strings α, α ,
P
. We show that with appropriately chosen parameters s, ϵ the above construction gives the desired correlation breaker with advice. We will use letters with prime to denote all the corresponding random variables produced by running the same algorithm on (X , Y ) instead of (X , Y ). Note that both X 1 and Y 1 has min-entropy at least 0.2d. Thus by Theorem 2.10 we have that
We now x (Y 1 , Y 1 ), and conditioned on this xing (Z , Z ) is a deterministic function of (X 1 , X 1 ), thus independent of (Y , Y ). Moreover, Z is close to uniform and the average conditional minentropy of Y is at least 0.9d − 2 × 0.3d = 0.3d. Now by Lemma 3.1, as long as 0.3d ≥ 4s + 2(2 + 1)3s + 2 log( 1 ϵ ) and 0.05d ≥ 4s + 2(2 + 1)3s + 2 log( 1 ϵ ), we have that for any 0 ≤ j ≤ 2 − 1,
By a hybrid argument and the triangle inequality, we have that
where each U s is independent of all the previous random variables (but may depend on later random variables). From now on, we will proceed as if each R j+1 is uniform given (Z , Z , {R 0 , R 0 , · · · , R j , R j }), since this only adds O ( 2 ϵ ) to the nal error.
Note that conditioned on the xing of (Z , Z ), we have that {(R i , R i ), i = 0, . . . , 2 } is a deterministic function of (Y , Y ), thus independent of (X , X ).
By symmetry, we can repeat the above argument while switching the role of X and Y . Speci cally, we can x (X 1 , X 1 ), and conditioned on this xing (Z , Z ) is a deterministic function of (Y 1 , Y 1 ), thus independent of (X , X ). Moreover, Z is close to uniform and the average conditional min-entropy of X is at least 0.9d − 2 × 0.3d = 0.3d. Now again by Lemma 3.1, as long as 0.3d ≥ 4s + 2( + 1)3s + 2 log( 1 ϵ ) and 0.05d ≥ 4s + 2( + 1)3s + 2 log( 1 ϵ ), we have that for any 0 ≤ j ≤ − 1,
By a hybrid argument and the triangle inequality, we have that (Z , Z , S 0 , S 0 , · · · , S , S ) ≈ O ( 2 ϵ ) (Z , Z , U s , S 0 , · · · , U s , S ), where each U s is independent of all the previous random variables (but may depend on later random variables). From now on, we will proceed as if each S j+1 is uniform given (Z , Z , {S 0 , S 0 , · · · , S j , S j }), since this only adds O ( 2 ϵ ) to the nal error.
Note that now conditioned on the xing of (Z , Z ), we have that {(S i , S i ), i = 0, . . . , } is a deterministic function of (X , X ), thus independent of (Y , Y ). Therefore, we can conclude that conditioned on the xing of (X 1 , X 1 , Y 1 , Y 1 , Z , Z ), we have that {(R i , R i ), i = 0, . . . , 2 } is a deterministic function of (Y , Y ), and {(S i , S i ), i = 0, . . . , } is a deterministic function of (X , X ), thus they are independent. Moreover each R i and S i is close to uniform given the previous random variables.
We now have the following claim. Indeed, since α α there exists an i ∈ [a] such that α i α i . Thus by Theorem 5.2, and noticing that 3s ≥ C 5.2 log(3s/ϵ ), the claim follows. Furthermore, notice that now conditioned on the xing of (R 0 , R 0 ), (V 0 , V 0 ) is a deterministic function of (S 0 , S 0 ), and thus independent of {(R i , R i ), i = 1, . . . , 2 }. We now have the following claim.
Claim 5.5. Assume that for some j ≤ , we have that for all i,
Furthermore there exists an i such that
Then for all i, we have that |(V j+1 i
, {R 0 , R 0 , · · · , R 2(j+1) , R 2(j+1) }) − (U s , {R 0 , R 0 , · · · , R 2(j+1) , R 2(j+1) })| 2(ϵ j + 2ϵ ). Furthermore there exits an i such that
To see the claim, we focus on the index i where the corresponding row V j i is close to uniform given V j i . The properties of the other rows can be obtained using similar and simpler arguments. Notice that conditioned on the xing of {R 0 , R 0 , · · · , R 2j , R 2j }, we have that (V j , V j ) is a deterministic function of (S 0 , S 0 , · · · , S j , S j ), and thus independent of (R 2j+1 , R 2j+1 ). Furthermore, by the property of the look-ahead extractor, we know that R 2j+1 is uniform. Now by Theorem 4.2, and noticing that s ≥ 8c log(3s/ϵ ), we know that whenever the NIPM merges the two rows in which one row of V j is uniform given the corresponding row of V j , the output obtained from V j will be uniform given the output obtained from V j . Thus, there exists an i such that
Now we x (R 2j+1 , R 2j+1 ), and conditioned on this xing (V j , V j )
is a deterministic function of (S 0 , S 0 , · · · , S j , S j ), and thus independent of (R 2(j+1) , R
2(j+1)
). Moreover now again by the property of the look-ahead extractor, we know that R 2(j+1) is uniform.
Therefore, we can rst x V j i and thenṼ Conditioned on this xing we have that V j i is still uniform, and that R 2(j+1) has average conditional min-entropy at least 3s − r = 3s − c log(3s/ϵ ) ≥ 23c log(2s/ϵ ). Therefore, by Theorem 2.9 we have that is a deterministic function of (R 2(j+1) , R
), and thus independent of (S j+1 , S j+1 ). Thus we can rst xṼ the proof. But these are functions of (Z 1 , · · · , Z i−1 ) and only output partial information. By examining the de nition of {Z i }, one can see that each Z i has m · 2 m bits, thus the size of (Z 1 , · · · , Z i−1 ) can be up to tm2 m . Therefore, in order to make sure this is less than n/2, one needs n ≥ 2tm2 m in the theorem, rather than n ≥ 2tm as currently written.
